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COMMENT
511 WEST 232ND OWNERS CORP.V.
JENNIFER REALTY CO.:
AN INSIGHT INTO THE DUTIES OF
COOPERATIVE CONVERSION SPONSORS
IN NEW YORK
KRISTINA WESCHt

INTRODUCTION

According to Judge Cardozo, "[tihe law has outgrown its
primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal."' Thus follows a
prevailing principle of contract interpretation: a court may
supply a contract term where an agreement between parties fails
to resolve the dispute that has arisen. 2 The New York Appellate
Division, First Department, in 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v.
3
drew on this rubric and made an
Jennifer Realty Co.,
unprecedented decision, holding that the sponsor of a cooperative
conversion has a duty to market those shares which remain
unsold at the time of conversion within a reasonable amount of
time. 4 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the

t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1996,
Queens College.
1 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917)
(finding a promise to use "reasonable efforts" to be fairly implied in a contract when
unexpressed).
2 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the
process of supplying terms).
3 285 A.D.2d 244, 729 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1st Dep't 2001), affd by a unanimous court,
98 N.Y.2d 144, 773 N.E.2d 496, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131 (2002).
4 Id. at 245, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 34-35.
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decision of the appellate division and left it for the lower court to
decide whether the sponsor's ten-year delay was reasonable. 5
In 1998 the cooperative corporation of 511 West 232nd, the
plaintiff in the action, became aware that Jennifer Realty, the
sponsor of the co-op, had turned down a purchase offer on a
vacant apartment. 6 Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an
action against Jennifer Realty and the members of the co-op's
board of directors to compel them to sell the unsold shares they
held since the July 15, 1988 closing. 7 These unsold shares
comprised more than sixty-two percent of the corporate stock,
giving the sponsor de facto control over the cooperative
corporation.8
The plaintiff alleged that the offering plan and material
omissions led them to believe that Jennifer Realty would sell the
shares "at the earliest opportunity, but in no event later than
when each unit became vacant."9 Instead of selling, the sponsor
kept all of its shares in order to rent vacant units to transient
tenants at a profit greater than what it would have reaped by

5 The appellate division certified the following question: "Was the order of this
Court, which modified the order of the Supreme Court, properly made?" 511 West
232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 151, 773 N.E.2d 496,
499, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131, 134 (2002). In an opinion by Judge Rosenblatt, the New York
Court of Appeals, passing only upon the sufficiency of the contract cause of action
and not the merits of the case, answered the certified question in the affirmative,
stating "that plaintiffs have pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract
sufficient to survive dismissal under CPLR 3211." Id. at 151, 773 N.E.2d at 499, 746
N.Y.S.2d at 134.
6 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 246, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
7 Id. at 245, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 34-35. Defendant had not sold any shares since
1990. Jennifer Realty, 98 N.Y.2d at 150, 773 N.E.2d at 498, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
8 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 245, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 35. In the cooperative
form of real estate ownership, the "owner" of the apartment does not own the unit
he lives, but rather owns stock in that building. This stock entitles him to a longterm proprietary lease of a unit within the building and gives him voting power in
this entity, which is termed a cooperative corporation. Thus, with regard to
occupancy, each stockholder is in the position of a tenant, with the corporation
acting as landlord. See Richard J. Kane, The Financing of Cooperatives and
Condominiums: A Retrospective, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 101, 115 (1999); see also
Vincent Di Lorenzo, Disclosure as Consumer Protection: Unit Purchasers'Need for

Additional Protections, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 43, 48 (1999) ("In form, cooperative

offerings are offerings of stock... although in substance they are offerings of
ownership of real estate."). For a discussion of the distinctions between cooperative
and condominium ownership, see Joel E. Miller, Condominiums and Cooperatives:
The General Utilities Repeal and Co-op to Condo Conversions, 16 J. REAL EST.
TAX'N 265, 267 (1989).
9 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 246, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
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Plaintiff additionally alleged that by
selling the shares. 10
unsold
shares, the board members breached
holding onto these
the fiduciary duties they owed to the cooperative corporation."
The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss the breach of contract complaint, and held that
"the parties' obligations to each other were contained exclusively
in the plan and subscription agreement, and that the plan did
not reveal any promise by the sponsor to sell the shares within
12
any particular time frame."
The Appellate Division, First Department reinstated the

breach of contract action, finding that although there was
neither an express term in the offering plan nor a state statutory
obligation that the sponsor shall sell unsold shares after an
offering plan has become effective, such an obligation does
indeed exist. 13 The court viewed the offering plan as a contract

between the sponsor and the unit purchasers.' 4 Approaching the
interpretation of the offering plan from a contractual basis, the
court employed the traditional principle of contract law that
10 Jennifer Realty, 98 N.Y.2d at 152, 773 N.E.2d at 499-500, 746 N.Y.S.2d at
134-35 ("The complaint narrates that the sponsor had represented that its expected
profits would depend on market conditions and the length of time required to sell
shares offered under the offering plan, but gave no hint that it would make a
sizeable profit by retaining a majority of those shares and leasing apartments at
market rates, free of the strictures of rent regulation.").
11 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 246, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
12 Id. at 246, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 35. Justice Jerry Crispino, sitting in the trial
court, "denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, permanent injunction and General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 fraud
claims." Id. at 248, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37. The appellate division modified the order
of the supreme court by dismissing the plaintiffs common law and General Business
Law fraud claims. Id. at 248, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36. Under the Martin Act, the plaintiff
did not have standing to raise the claims because only the attorney general can take
action against fraudulent securities practices that violate the Act, and "[wihile
private plaintiffs may maintain common-law fraud claims, plaintiffs are not
permitted to disguise claims which rightfully belong to the Attorney General as
their own." Id. at 248, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
13 See id. at 246-47, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 35-36. In New York City, conversions to
cooperative and condominium ownership are controlled by General Business Law
section 352-eeee. Section 352-eeee(2)(d)(ix) states that a sponsor must offer the
tenants-in-occupancy the exclusive right to purchase the apartments or the shares
appurtenant thereto during the initial ninety days after the date that an eviction
plan was accepted for filing. The statute is otherwise silent as to any duty to sell
unsold shares once the offering plan has been effectuated. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 352-eeee(2)(d)(ix) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2002).
14 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36; see also 61 W. 62
Owners Corp. v. Harkness Apartment Owners Corp., 222 A.D.2d 358, 358-59, 635
N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (1st Dep't 1995) (analyzing the offering plan as a contract).
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"[i]mplied promises are recognized when... necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the contract." 15 Because the purpose of
the offering plan was for the sponsor to sell cooperative
apartments within the building, the court found and implied
promise that the unsold shares would be sold within a
reasonable amount of time was necessarily part of the offering
plan. 16 Furthermore, from the vantage point of the plaintiff, it
was generally understood at the time of contract formation that
the sponsor would diligently market and dispose of his units as
soon as circumstances permitted, allowing plaintiff to realize the
benefits of being cooperative owners.' 7 All parties recognized the
attainment of these benefits as the primary objective of the
transaction.' 8
Thus, the basis of the appellate division's holding was that
the plan, viewed as a contract, contained both express and
implied promises. 19 In using this theory to hold that the sponsor
15 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36. In making this
determination, the court relied on Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N.Y. 466, 468-69, 100
N.E.2d 39, 40 (1912), which asserted that what is implied in a contract is as much a
part of the contract as what is expressed, and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 90-91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917), which stated that promises can be fairly
implied in a contract.
16 See JenniferRealty, 285 A.D.2d at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
17 See id. at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36. The court noted that the plaintiff did not
realize any of the benefits of cooperative ownership that induced it to engage in the
transaction in the first place. "[Tihey are unable to sell or refinance their purchased
units, [they] must subsidize repairs for Jennifer Realty's rental units, and are forced
to live in a building populated by transient tenants." Id. at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
18 See id. at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36. It has been recognized that one of the
primary benefits of cooperative ownership is the shareholders' ability to create a
stable environment of owners of their own choosing. See Kane, supra note 8, at 103;
Michael A. Riccardi, 'Reasonable Time' Restricts Sponsor on Selling Co-ops, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 10, 2001, at 1. Another primary benefit is a voice in self-management. See
Di Lorenzo, supra note 8, at 56.
Legislative history also supports this interpretation of the policy behind
cooperative conversions. In enacting General Business Law section 352-eeee, the
legislature declared that "cooperative... ownership is an effective method of
preserving, stabilizing and improving neighborhoods and the supply of sound
housing accommodations." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee note (McKinney 1996)
(Legislative findings of L.1982, c. 555, §1). From this it can be surmised that
Jennifer Realty's "10-year failure to sell more than 60 percent of the shares... may
have defeated the intent of the plan, since the building is populated mainly by
transient tenants and not owners." Riccardi, supra at 18. For more on the benefits of
cooperative ownership, see Scott E. Mollen, Alternate Dispute Resolution of
Condominium and Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 75, 78-79 (1999).
19 See Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 35-36; see also
Grossman, 206 N.Y. at 469, 100 N.E. at 40 ("A contract includes, not only what the
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of a cooperative conversion has a duty to sell unsold shares

within a reasonable amount of time, the First Department
injected an unprecedented new standard into cooperative
conversion law. The court, however, completely failed to lay out
the parameters of its holding; it provided no guidelines regarding
the scope of the holding, and it did not explain how courts were
to apply the holding in future cases. Furthermore, the opinion
declined to even acknowledge several serious ramifications that

20
would result from enforcement of this implied duty.
Upon appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
order of the appellate division. 21 It is arguable, however,
whether the Court of Appeals merely affirmed the appellate
division's decision to reinstate the contract cause of action, or
whether the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's
findings on the merits with regard to the breach of contract

claim.22 The confusion on this point originates from the fact that
after an analysis of the implicit duties arising in contract

dealings, the Court of Appeals made the following statement:

parties said, but also what is necessarily to be implied from what they said.").
20 See Scott E. Mollen, Realty Law Digest, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 2001, at 5
[hereinafter Mollen, Sept. 12, 2001] (commenting that "the subject decision does not
attempt to define 'a reasonable time'....").
21 See 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 154,
773 N.E.2d 496, 501, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131, 136 (2002).
22 The majority of opinions voiced thus far seem to agree that the Court of
Appeals clearly did not pass upon the merits of the breach of contract cause of
action. See Kenneth R. Jacobs, Right of Co-op CorporationsCompel Sponsors to Sell
Apartments, 16 N.Y. REAL EST. L. REP. 1 (2002) (arguing that the court's analysis
was restricted to the sufficiency of the cause of action under the facts pleaded);
Adrienne B. Koch, Does a Sponsor Have a Duty to Sell Co-Op Shares?, N.Y. L.J.,
July 22, 2002, at 4, 6 (interpreting the Court of Appeals' decision as an
acknowledgement that a co-op could demonstrate that an offering plan led it to infer
an implied duty into the contract "to sell shares faster than [the sponsor] ultimately
did"); Scott E. Mollen, Realty Law Digest, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 28, 2002, at 6 [hereinafter
Mollen, Aug. 28, 2002] (agreeing that the issue is still open for litigation); Jay
Romano, Conversions and Their Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, § 11 (Real
Estate), at 5 [hereinafter Romano, June 30, 2002] (stating that many believe the
court only afforded shareholders an opportunity to prove that such an implied duty
exists); Jay Romano, Duty to Sell Apartments by Sponsor, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2002, § 11 (Real Estate), at 5 [hereinafter Romano, June 23, 2002] (quoting
attorneys who believe the court only said that "it is conceivable that there may be
circumstances where a sponsor may have made an implicit promise to sell
apartments"). But see id. (citing the argument by the chairman and president of the
Council of New York Cooperatives and Condominiums, who both say that the Court
of Appeals has "definitively" ruled that a sponsor has a duty to sell apartments
within a reasonable amount of time).
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We emphasize, however, that we address only the sufficiency of
the contract cause of action and not its merits. We note that
the Appellate Division went so far as to hold that the sponsor
had undertaken a duty to dispose of the units within a
reasonable time. The Court thus decided that issue and left
open only the question
of whether the sponsor's 10-year delay
23
was reasonable.

Regardless of this debate, it seems likely that this issue will
be the subject of future litigation. Assuming that the Court of
Appeals did not affirm the appellate division's findings on the
merits, 24 three issues will necessarily need to be resolved: (1)
whether or not a sponsor has a contractual duty to sell shares;
(2) what percentage of shares may a sponsor hold onto while
establishing a viable co-op; 25 and (3) what is a reasonable
amount of time for the sponsor to sell such shares. The answers
to these questions will establish guidelines so that the holding
could be applied to other cooperative conversion disputes. This
Comment analyzes the issues raised by the appellate division's
holding26 and some of the potential effects of attempting to
27
enforce such a duty if such a duty exists.
Part I of this Comment will analyze the rationale behind
imposing the implied duty, and it explores alternative theories
under which to base a sponsor's implied duty to diligently sell
unsold shares. There are several modes of analysis by which the

23 Jennifer Realty, 98 N.Y.2d at 154, 773 N.E.2d at 501, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
24 Notwithstanding the current debate, I argue that this is a fair assumption
given the court's statement that "[alt this preanswer stage of the litigation, we need
not reach the merits of plaintiffs' contract cause of action and therefore do not
address the issue of whether, as alleged, the sponsor impliedly promised to sell all

its unsold shares." Id. at 154, 773 N.E.2d at 501, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
25 The Court of Appeals spoke of the shareholders' expectation of "creat[ing] a
viable cooperative." Id. at 154, 773 N.E.2d at 501, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 136. Therefore,

much of the current discussion is focused on what constitutes a viable co-op and how
a sponsor establishes one.

26 For further discussion on the ramifications of the holding, see Jay Romano,
Little Clarity in Decision on Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, §11 (Real Estate),
at 5.
27 While the discussion in this Comment is limited to New York law, this is an
issue likely to come up in other states where the cooperative form of real estate
ownership is highly utilized. In the United States, the cooperative form of housing is

most prevalent in New York and Chicago. Co-ops are also found in Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Florida but with less frequency than in New York and Chicago. Most
of the country, including many large cities, do not utilize the cooperative form of
real estate ownership. See Kane, supra note 8, at 103-04.
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court could have found such a duty; however, the implications of
this duty remain the same regardless of how it is rationalized.
Part II addresses the question of what constitutes a viable
cooperative corporation and the issue of what interval
constitutes a reasonable time in which the sponsor must sell
unsold shares. It discusses whether the requirement to sell
within a reasonable amount of time applies only to vacant units
or to all unsold shares. Further, it must be determined if market
conditions should be taken into account in determining whether
the sponsor has fulfilled his duty and, if they may not be taken
into account, whether the sponsor is expected to sell at a loss,
absorbing the cost himself. Part II concludes by stating that the
sponsor does not have to execute a sale immediately upon
vacancy in all circumstances; however, he has a duty to
diligently market the vacant units in order to facilitate
fulfillment of the shareholders' expectations even if this may
result in a pecuniary loss.
Part III discusses the alarming reality that, if sponsors are
unable to fulfill this duty, there is likely to be a large increase of
sponsor default leading to severe political, social, and economic
consequences. 28
In the past, sponsors defaulted because
economic conditions imposed unforeseeable hardships on them.
The Martin Act, which aims to protect the unsophisticated
purchaser, sought to incorporate safeguards to protect tenant
shareholders by increasing their awareness of the financial
aspects of the cooperative conversion process. Any court action
that might incidentally lead to a dramatic increase in instances
of sponsor default would be contrary to the public policy that
underlies the Martin Act and the public protections that it
promotes.
Finally, Part IV explores whether this is an issue best
resolved by the legislature through amendment to section
352-eeee of New York General Business Law ("section 352-eee"),
or whether this is an appropriate situation for judicial law
making. Ultimately I argue that this issue is not well suited for
legislative determination, but rather it necessitates a more
flexible approach that would be best evolved through case law. A
compromise is proposed, which would entail legislative
28 See Mollen, Sept. 12, 2001, supra note 20 (acknowledging comments that
sponsors might be compelled to walk away, defaulting on their maintenance
obligations in light of the JenniferRealty holding).
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enactment of an amendment to section 352-eeee, making it
necessary for a sponsor to sell shares within a reasonable
amount of time after conversion, and providing guidelines for the
courts to follow in determining damages when non-compliance
occurs.
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES
In New York City, cooperative conversions are governed by
352-eeee. 29 The widely accepted dual purpose of the statute is to
set forth the rights of purchasing tenants and the duties that a
sponsor has to the parties in occupancy at the time of the
conversion. 30 Yet on its face, the statute does not give any
guidance regarding a sponsor's duty to sell shares beyond the
first ninety days subsequent to effectuation of a plan; therefore,
the appellate division had to look beyond the face of the statute
31
in formulating its determination.
I.

29 For discussion of how General Business Law section 352-eeee works to
govern cooperative conversion plans in the City of New York, see De Kovessey v.
Coronet Prop. Co., 69 N.Y.2d 448, 454, 508 N.E.2d 652, 654-57, 515 N.Y.S.2d 740,
742 (1987). See also James A. Maccaro, Cooperative Conversions and Apartment
Warehousing, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 30-31 (1991); James P. Godman, Note, (E)state of
the Law: An Estate's Right to Purchase Its Decedent's Apartment During a
Cooperative Conversion, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1347, 1349 (1989).
Section 352-eeee is only one portion of the Martin Act, which governs the offer
and sale of securities, commodities, cooperative apartments, and condominiums.
The Martin Act grants broad investigative and prosecutorial powers to the New
York State Attorney General. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1996
& Supp. 2002); see also Gregory G. Faragasso, Note, A Policy Analysis of New York
State's Security Takeover Disclosure Act, BROOK. L. REV. 1117, 1138-39, 1139 n.117
(1988) (discussing the powers of the Attorney General).
30 One of the main purposes of section 352-eeee is to protect non-purchasing
tenants by giving them indefinite rights to occupancy. Another purpose is to protect
tenants-in-occupancy from being displaced at the time of conversion by giving them
the exclusive right to purchase their apartments for ninety days following the
acceptance of the offering plan. See Godman, supra note 29, at 1349-50, 1350 n.13.
The legislative findings support this, stating "that preventive action by the
legislature in restricting rents and evictions during the process of conversion from
rental to cooperative or condominium status is imperative to assure that such
conversions will not result in unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental
agreements affecting non-purchasing tenants." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee
(McKinney 1995) (Legislative findings of L.1982, c. 555, §1).
31 See 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 285 A.D.2d 244, 24647, 729 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35-36 (1st Dep't 2001) (acknowledging that "a sponsor's
statutory obligations are primarily found in the Martin Act" and stating that the
statute does not impose an obligation on the sponsor to dispose of unsold shares
after the offering plan has been effectuated).

2003]

CO-OP CONVERSION SPONSERS IN NEW YORK

19,4

In light of the statute's failure to address the issue at hand
in Jennifer Realty, the appellate division determined that it
"must look to the offering plan and subscription agreement" in
order to reach a conclusion in this case. 32 Relying on the maxim
that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement," 33
the court found an implied duty to sell within the offering plan.34
The court did not have to turn to the offering plan to find
such an implied duty, as there were alternative means available
to reach the same end. 35 For instance, because the Martin Act
itself is rich with measures aimed at protecting tenants in the
conversion process, the court could have easily found such a duty
implicit within section 352-eeee. 36 An example of the protective
32

Id. at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36.

33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205 (1981).

34 Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36. See supra notes
13-20 and accompanying text.
When a court is put into the position of supplying such an implied-in-law term,
it relies primarily on the perceived expectations of the parties at the time of contract
formation. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.9, at 458. Hence, the appellate
division used commonly known goals of the shareholders to infer their expectations
and incorporated them into the offering plan. Jennifer Realty, 285 A.D.2d at 247,
729 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
35 Both the New York Court of Appeals and the New York Appellate Division,
First Department, have previously found that the sponsor of a cooperative
conversion has a duty to "meet high standards of fair dealing and good faith toward
tenants," but both courts failed to identify the source of this implied duty. See
Vermeer Owners, Inc. v. Guterman, 78 N.Y.2d 1114, 1116, 585 N.E.2d 377, 378, 578
N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (1991); Rossi v. Twinbogo Co., 232 A.D.2d 266, 267, 648 N.Y.S.2d
97, 97 (1st Dep't 1996) (citing Guterman and acknowledging the duty of good faith
and fair dealing).
The court's decision to focus on the offering plan might have been influenced by
another recent case, 61 West 62 Owners Corp. v. HarknessApartment Owners Corp.,
222 A.D.2d 358, 359, 635 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (1st Dep't 1995), where the court
interpreted contractual provisions between the parties and determined that the
offering plan was the guiding document for resolving disputes. See Jennifer Realty,
285 A.D.2d at 247, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 36. In using this decision as guidance, however,
the Jennifer Realty court failed to recognize that the parties in Harkness had
ensured that the plan would be the governing document during the bargaining
process. The contract of sale in Harkness also provided that the terms and
provisions of the plan would govern in any conflict between the offering plan and
the contract. Furthermore, the plan itself provided that any conflict between the
offering plan and the contract of sale would be resolved in favor of the plan.
Harkness, 222 A.D.2d at 359, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
36 The statute uses the term "good faith" several times. The phrase "pursuant
to an offering made in good faith without fraud" is found in both the definitions of
"non-eviction plan" and "eviction plan," as well as in the criteria for declaring an
eviction plan effective. N.Y. GEN Bus LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(d)(i)
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nature of the Martin Act is indicated by the legislative history
which states that one of the reasons for this section of the Martin
Act is to assure that tenants involved in the conversion process
would not be displaced from their apartments in the event that
they chose not to buy. 37 More importantly, the legislative
findings indicate that public policy was a paramount
38
consideration in drafting of the statute.
Scholars have indicated that where "no law either
prohibits... or explicitly authorizes [a right or duty], the issue
should turn on its public policy ramifications." 39 Furthermore,
the various clauses of section 352-eeee are filled with public
policy undertones. 40 For example, there are many provisions
directed at non-purchasing tenants, particularly those who are
41
elderly or disabled, and those who are rent-regulated tenants.
Statements such as "In]o eviction proceedings will be commenced
at any time against non-purchasing tenants for failure to
purchase," 42 "[nion-purchasing tenants who reside in dwelling
units subject to government regulation... shall continue to be
subject thereto,"43 and "tihe rentals of non-purchasing tenants
who reside in dwelling units not subject to government
regulation... shall not be subject to unconscionable increases
(McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2002). The court therefore could have deduced that the
drafters of the legislation intended that good faith be a general requirement in the
conversion process.

37See supra note 30. The legislative findings concede the importance of
"protecting tenants in possession who do not desire or who are unable to purchase
the units in which they reside from being coerced into vacating such units." N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-eeee note (McKinney 1995) (Legislative findings of L.1982, c.
555, §1). Additionally, the appellate division has previously recognized these
concerns, describing the "obsessing fear" that tenants have about being evicted in a

conversion. Gilligan v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 126 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (1st
Dep't 1953).
38 Section 1 of the findings talks of both "public policy" and "public interest."
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee (McKinney 1995) (Legislative findings of L.1982, c.
555, §1).
39 Godman, supra note 29, at 1366; see also Bruce Czachor, Comment,
Cooperativeand Condominium Conversionsin New York: The Tenant in Occupancy,
31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763, 789 (1986) (discussing determinations founded on
public policy).
40 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(c) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2002)
(requiring "at least fifty-one percent" of the purchasing tenants to have signed
written agreements "in good faith without fraud and with no discriminatory...
inducements" before eviction of a non-purchasing tenant is permissible).
41 See id. § 352-eeee(2)(c)(iii), (2)(c)(iv), (2)(d)(iii).
42 Id. § 352-eeee(2)(c)(ii).
43 Id. § 352-eeee(2)(c)(iii).
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[in rent],"44 indicate that the legislature's overriding concern was
that of protecting the public from fraudulent motives for
conversion. In fact, a previous New York State attorney general
contended that "the Martin Act should be construed broadly to
protect fraudulent exploitation of the public generally." 45
While the above quoted statements are admittedly aimed at
protecting only non-purchasing tenants, they are indicative of a
general public policy seeking to restrain sponsors. The text of
section 352-eeee, combined with the legislative history and
findings, reveals that the legislature was aware of the dangers
that could ensue from a sponsor's superior bargaining position.
The various protections written into the Martin Act reveal the
legislature's desire to control the sponsor's power so that he may
not use it against the tenants-the tenants being the very people
that are meant to benefit from the conversion process. The court
could easily have used these underlying public policy concerns to
conclude the existence of an implicit statutory duty of good faith
and fair dealing on the part of the sponsor.
Another method by which the court could have found an
implied duty is through the relationship of majority and minority
shareholders. 46 This analysis, however, proves more difficult
because the standards that need to be met are more ambiguous,
and the burden of proof placed on the minority shareholders is
more stringent. The cooperative relationship can be analogized
to a closely held corporation in which majority shareholders have
a heightened fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. 47 In spite
of this heightened duty, many courts, including those in New
York, still take a restrictive approach to fiduciary duties in

Id. § 352-eeee(2)(c)(iv).
Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Abrams, 72 N.Y.2d 553, 558, 531
N.E.2d 627, 629, 534 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (1988) (stating Attorney General Robert
Abrams' position).
46 Although section 352-e(1)(b) of the General Business Law mentions that the
offering plan must address the nature of the fiduciary relationship of the principals
involved, there is no interpretation of this provision nor any indication how it might
play out in disputes regarding the offering plan. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1)(b)
(McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2002).
47 See S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919). As there is no case law
interpreting this, the peculiar type of corporation formed by a cooperative
conversion seems to be best analogized to a closely held corporation. A closely held
(or close) corporation is one "whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only a
few shareholders." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999). A cooperative
corporation seems to satisfy these general characteristics.
4
45
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closely held corporations. 48 For instance, in Orloff v. Weinstein
Enterprises, Inc.,49 plaintiff minority shareholders claimed that
they were "denied an effective voice in management." 50 The
court concluded that, although the minority shareholders
sufficiently proved "exclu[sion] from having an active voice in
important corporate decision making,"51 in order to prove a
breach of fiduciary duty the minority shareholders would have
had "to show that decisions made in [their] absence were either
significant, or adverse to [their] interests."5 2 Thus it follows that
in the Jennifer Realty situation, it may not be enough for the
shareholders to prove that they were denied a voice in
management because the sponsor held onto a substantial
percentage of shares--entitling him to a substantial percentage
of voting power in the corporation. The tenant shareholders
might have to prove actual damages flowing out of this denial.
Proving actual damages in the cooperative corporation context
may be difficult, if not impossible.
Although there are many different analyses one might use to
establish a sponsor's duty to sell unsold shares within a
reasonable amount of time, it seems that the Jennifer Realty
court chose the contractual approach because it is the one that
most logically flows out of the circumstances, and it also has the
clearest guidelines.
Nonetheless, the practical effects of
establishing this duty to sell unsold shares within a reasonable
time remain the same regardless of how it is rationalized, and
the imposition of such a duty finds support in many different
areas of the law.

48 See Sandra K. Miller, How Should U.K and U.S. Minority Shareholder
Remedies for Unfairly Prejudicialor Oppressive Conduct Be Reformed?, 36 AM. Bus.
L.J. 579, 588-90 (1999) (discussing the restrictive approaches of various
jurisdictions).
49 247 A.D.2d 63, 677 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dep't 1998).
50 Id. at 65, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 545. Here a closely held corporation was involved,
with the majority defendants holding fifty-seven percent of its shares, and the
minority defendants holding thirty-three percent. The remaining ten percent of
shares were owned by the plaintiff. Id. at 64-65, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
51 Id. at 67, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 546.

52 Id.
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II. ASSESSING THE REASONABLE TIME REQUIREMENT FOR
SELLING SHARES

A. Application of Law
Traditionally, disputes arising under landlord-tenant
agreements have not been subject to the same theories of
resolution as other contractual breaches. 53 For years, courts
have been dueling over the benefits of striking down this
approach and resolving such claims under modern contract
theory. 54 In this case, the proper analysis is under contract
theory.
The shareholders in Jennifer Realty are entitled to a
proprietary lease of a particular unit in the building by way of
their ownership of shares. 55 The fact that occupancy rights are
granted by way of a lease means that, in the eyes of the law,
each shareholder is in the position of tenant in relation to the
cooperative corporation, which functions as a landlord. Two
points make this concern a negligible factor with regard to
analyzing the instant case under contract theory. First, the
53 In the traditional analysis, courts have utilized the special rules governing
real property transactions to resolve controversies. These special rules are based on
the view that a leasehold is a present transfer of an estate in real property. Such a
traditional analysis severely limits the rights and remedies available to tenants. For
example, there can be no finding of implied warranties, and a landlord has no duty
to mitigate damages. See Holy Prop. Ltd. v. Kenneth Cole Prod., Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 130,
133, 661 N.E.2d 694, 696, 637 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (1995) (reaffirming the old doctrine
as it applies to commercial property transactions).
54 See id. at 133, 661 N.E.2d at 696, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 966. Although currently
unsuccessful in New York State, the movement toward reform in New York first
became prevalent in the 1970s. See LeFrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 200-03,
390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962-64 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1976) (discussing a need to
revise the approach to lease disputes), modified, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 633, 403 N.Y.S.2d
397, 398 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1978) (holding that modernizing concepts of
landlord and tenant law was not necessary in this case); Parkwood Realty Co. v.
Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 691, 353 N.Y.2d 623, 624-26 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1974) (maintaining that there is no longer a good reason for the distinction
and recognizing the growing trend toward reading mutual contract obligations into
residential leases). For further discussion of the traditional analysis and recognition
that a contractual approach would best serve modern disputes, see Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Today, New York State strongly
adheres to the historical distinction. See Holy Prop. Ltd., 87 N.Y.2d at 133, 661
N.E.2d at 696, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 966 (holding that leases are not subject to the
general contractual rule); Wallis v. Falken-Smith, 136 A.D.2d 506, 506, 523
N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (1st Dep't 1988) (stating that there is no need to reconsider the
traditional approach).
55 See supra note 8.
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foundation of the present dispute is the offering plan-a contract
fundamentally concerned with setting out the details of the
conversion process and the transfer of shares, not with the
granting of a propriety lease. 56 Second, the New York Court of
Appeals has concluded that, in disputes between a shareholder
and the cooperative board regarding issues arising from the
shareholder's proprietary lease, the goals of a cooperative
corporation "are best served by a standard of review that is
analogous to the business judgment rule."57 This conclusion
largely negates the idea that the relationship between the
shareholder and the cooperative corporation is simply one of the
conventional landlord and tenant. Case law has proven this
notion untrue, even when dealing with tenancy-like issues that
arise in the relationship.
Therefore, the analysis in the
subsequent sections will focus heavily on traditional contract
theory for resolution of the issues involved.
B.

Reasonable Time and Considerationof Market Conditions
Ascertaining the correct standard of "reasonableness" in any
given set of facts has always been a struggle for the courts. 58
Such a standard inevitably fluctuates depending on the
circumstances of the parties, 59 and its determination is generally
dependent on the expectations of the parties at the time of
contracting.60 What is "reasonable" in a specific case is by and
61
large a matter of law.
56 See 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 285 A.D.2d 244, 247,
729 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (1st Dep't 2002) ("An offering plan is a contract between the
sponsor and the unit purchasers. Its purpose is to sell cooperative apartments
within a building.") (citation omitted); see also 4 WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL
PROPERTY § 3.02 (4th ed. 2001) (stating that the offering plan is to contain "a fair
summary of all material aspects of the offering").
57 Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 537, 553
N.E.2d 1317, 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (1990). The business judgment rule
prohibits judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors that were taken in good
faith and in furtherance of the legitimate corporate purposes. Id. at 537, 553 N.E.2d
at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 811; see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207
N.Y. 115, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (1912).
58 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.28, at 211.
59 See id. at 212.
60 See id. § 7.9, at 458.
61 See Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 200, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. Queens County 1976) (finding that "as a matter of law 17 months is an
unreasonable period of time" to leave a middle class apartment vacant) (emphasis
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In Jennifer Realty, it is apparent that the interests of the
opposing parties are in conflict; tenants generally seek
conversion because of their motivation to become self-regulating
and to achieve a community of permanent, as opposed to
transient, unit occupiers 62 while sponsors seek conversion in
hopes that the profit they gain by selling units to tenants will
heavily outweigh the profits they would have received by
collecting rent.63 It follows that the expectations of the parties
are in line with their respective interests. Shareholders expect
the unsold shares to be sold as soon as possible because nothing
in the conversion process indicates when to sell or even whether
to sell shares at all. On the other hand, sponsors might wholly
expect that they are authorized to use their discretion in selling
the unsold shares so that they may do so when it is their best
interests to sell. They would want to hold on to the units either
indefinitely or until they can receive the highest possible market
price upon selling. Sponsors may also want to be able to retain
their units if they are able to make more money by renting them
64
rather than selling them.
The law that governs the duties of good faith in a
contractual situation is helpful in solving the question of what
constitutes a reasonable time. An obligation of good faith and
fair dealing in the performance of a contract is one of the most
frequently implied terms in contract law. 65 The Restatement of
added), modified, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't
1978).
62 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
63 See Godman, supra note 29, at 1347-48. Another recognized goal of some
sponsors of cooperative conversions is a type of "deregulation" of the building. By
buying out rent-regulated tenants or waiting for them to leave the building, the
sponsor is able to free up those regulated units so that in the future, a shareholder
who would like to rent out the apartment can do so at market value, which might be
at a significantly higher rent than that which a rent regulated tenant would pay.

See Kane, supra note 8, at 121-22.
Note that the sponsor may buy out the rent-regulated tenant, becoming the
shareholder to that unit, and sublet the unit to market rate tenants. This

essentially allows the sponsor to remain in the position of landlord while quickly,
easily, and profitably deregulating his building without risk of acting unlawfully.
64 It has become a common practice for sponsors to hold units and rent them at
the going market rate for two reasons. First, it works to financially compensate for
the low rent paid by rent controlled tenants who continue to reside in the building.

Second, the sponsor might not be able to otherwise cover maintenance costs. In such
a situation, the sponsor might seek to use the money from market tenants to
compensate for the shortfall. See Romano, June 30, 2002, supra note 22.
65 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.17, at 504 (stating that this term of good
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Contracts dictates that such an obligation is implied in every
66
contract.
While the scope of the term "good faith" varies with its
context, it has been read to embrace "'any promises which a
reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be
justified in understanding were included.' "67 Also implied is a
promise that neither party "shall do anything which will have
the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract." 68 Thus, from these two
statements one can conclude that the sponsor has a duty of good
faith in dealing with the plaintiff, and this duty encompasses
selling the vacant units. It can also be concluded that the
its own interests ahead of
sponsor violated this duty by putting
69
those of the tenant shareholders.
The tenants' "fruits of the contract" are the benefits that
cooperative ownership bring them. While the recognized "fruits
of the contract" on the sponsor's side, namely financial benefits,
are just as legitimate as those on the shareholder tenants' side,
the shareholders "were justified in understanding" that the
faith and fair dealing is often implied).
66 See section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts, which is entitled "Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing" and provides that "[elvery contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
The Uniform Commercial Code also recognizes the existence of such a duty. See
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). Section 1-203 is entitled "Obligation of Good Faith" and
provides that "[elvery contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." Id.
67 Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 385 N.E.2d 566, 569,
412 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (1978) (quoting 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1293, at 3682
(rev. ed. 1937)); see also N.Y. Univ. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308, 318, 662
N.E.2d 763, 769, 639 N.Y.S.2d 283, 289 (1995) (following Rowe by looking to what
the reasonable insured person would understand the insurer's promise to be). This
would explain the appellate division's acceptance of the plaintiffs argument that
the offering plan led them to believe that the sponsor would sell the unsold shares
as quickly as possible after conversion. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
68 Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163,
167 (1933); see also Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96, 100-01, 97 N.E. 472, 473
(1912); Tapps of Nassau Supermarkets, Inc. v. Linden Boulevard, L.P., 269 A.D.2d
306, 307, 704 N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (1st Dep't 2000).
69 See Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 87 N.Y.2d 384, 389, 663 N.E.2d 289, 29192, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979-80 (1995) (synthesizing Rowe and Kirke to derive a
comprehensive analysis). The Dalton court noted that "[w]here the contract
contemplates the exercise of discretion," there is a "promise not to act arbitrarily or
irrationally in exercising that discretion," but that the implication of good faith and
fair dealing is limited when it is inconsistent with other terms of the contract. Id. at
389, 663 N.E.2d at 291-92, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 979-80.
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sponsor promised that it would not do anything to sabotage the
fulfillment of the tenants' reasonable motivation for entering
into the agreement. In an extreme case like Jennifer Realty,
failure to sell a majority of the apartments clearly constitutes an
injury to the tenants' rights to realize the fruits of their contract
and is therefore in violation of the contract.
Even if
relinquishing control of a majority of the apartments meant that
the sponsor would have to face some economic loss, he should be
obligated to do so.
The reason the sponsor may have to face some pecuniary
loss is because of another frequently implied term-that of "best"
or "reasonable" efforts.7 0 This term has been interpreted to
mean that a party is required "to make such efforts as are
reasonable in the light of that party's ability and the means at
71
its disposal and of the other party's justifiable expectations."
As indicated above, "[iun every contract there... exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."7 2 The implied
duty of fair dealing actually reaches beyond mere good faith.
Not only is one party required to refrain from impeding the other
party's reasonable goals in formulating the contract but also, in
most cases, affirmative action is required to meet the standard of
"best efforts." 73 Yet this duty is not any more clearly defined
than the duty of good faith described above--" '[b]est efforts' is a
term 'which necessarily takes its meaning from the

circumstances.'

"74

70 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.17, at 509.

71 Id. The Restatement of Contracts is silent on best efforts. The U.C.C.
acknowledges a duty of best efforts in a provision that guides exclusive dealings.
Once again, while this is not a contract for goods, the situation that the Jennifer

Realty tenants are faced with is akin to an exclusive dealings contract. Subsection
two of this provision reads as follows: "A lawful agreement by either the seller or
the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless
otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods

and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale."
U.C.C. § 2-306 (1978).
72 Kirke La Shelle Co., 263 N.Y. at 87, 188 N.E. at 167.
73 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 152 (7th ed. 1999) (stating that "Idliligent
attempts to carry out an obligation" are required and further that "a best-efforts

obligation is stronger than good-faith obligation").
74 Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(quoting Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 308 F. Supp. 743, 748 (S.D.N.Y.

1970), affd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co.,
99 N.E. 221, 226 (Mass. 1912) (" '[Blest energies' meant such effort as in the exercise
of sound judgment would be likely to produce the most profitable results to the
[promisee] in view of the nature of the business and the extent of territory over
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Such a duty of best efforts is implied with exceptional
frequency in exclusive agency agreement situations, where it is
often found that the exclusive agent has a fiduciary duty to
uphold. 75 It is proper to analogize the sponsor's situation to an
exclusive agreement because the sponsor is the only one who is
able to sell the unsold shares-he is the only person who has
control and discretion over them. The shareholders are relying
solely on the sponsor to facilitate the realization of their goals. It
has been conceded that "[u]nless [the exclusive agent] gave his
'76
efforts, [the party relying on him] could never get anything.
More importantly, it would be irrational to infer that a party is
placed at the mercy of his exclusive agent. 77 Thus, in the type of
situation that Jennifer Realty finds itself in, a duty of best
efforts is necessarily implied.
Such a duty has not been fulfilled until a so-called "viable coop" has been formed. 78 Determination of what constitutes a
viable co-op is a necessary inquiry in determining whether a
sponsor has fulfilled his implied-in-law duty. Keeping in mind
the underlying purposes and goals of a cooperative conversion, it
would be safe to assume that a co-op cannot be viable until
shareholders have a true voice in management, can obtain
market rate financing, can sell their units at market rates, and
until the building is no longer primarily occupied by transient
tenants. 79 One scholar has suggested five elements to consider
80
in ascertaining whether a cooperative corporation is "viable":
8
1. "Liquidity in Sales and Debt" '

which it was to be conducted.").
75 See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 30
N.Y.2d 34, 46, 281 N.E.2d 142, 145, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 333-34 (1972).
76 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917).
77 See Hearn v. Charles A. Stevens & Bro., 111 A.D. 101, 106, 97 N.Y.S. 566,
569-70 (1st Dep't 1906) ("[Tjhe fact that a construction... place[d] one of the
parties entirely at the mercy of the other may properly be taken into consideration."
(citing Russell v. Allerton, 108 N.Y. 288, 15 N.E. 391 (N.Y. 1888))).
78 See 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 154,
773 N.E.2d 496, 501, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131, 136 (2002).
79 "A viable co-op is a co-op that is run by the residents of the building for the
benefit of the cooperative and its cooperative purchasers." Romano, June 30, 2002,
supra note 22 (quoting Beatrice Lessner, attorney for 511 West 232nd Owners
Corp.).
80 For the proposal and expansion of these five factors, see Jacobs, supra note
81 Id.
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This considers the ability of the shareholders to sell
their units or refinance their cooperative loans.
Furthermore, it also considers whether the cooperative
corporation itself is forced to refinance its underlying
mortgage on unfavorable terms.
82
2. "Control of the Cooperative Corporation."
The Martin Act requires sponsors to surrender control
of the board within five years after the cooperative
corporation has been established.8 3
This has been
interpreted to mean that "after the five years have
expired, the sponsor cannot use its voting rights to elect a
majority of directors nominated or designated by it."84
85
3. "Rentals to Sales" Ratio.

This undoubtedly has an impact on whether or not the
cooperative is "viable."
The greater the amount of
transient tenants, the greater the wear and tear on the
building, increasing maintenance fees. Additionally, this
compromises
the 8 6 stable
environment
that
the
shareholders sought.
4. "Purpose of a 'Cooperative Housing Corporation.' "187
One of the purposes of a cooperative corporation is to
provide residential housing for its shareholders.
Therefore, it has been suggested that viability may
be
88
linked to fulfilling this underlying corporate purpose.
5. "Duty Not to 'Abandon' Plan."8 9
Statutorily, a sponsor may not abandon an offering
plan once it has become effective. 90 It is uncertain
82
83

Id.
Id.; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, § 18.3(v)(5)(i) (1997).

84 Sherbansky v. 117 W. 81st St. Tenants Corp., 238 A.D.2d 246, 247, 657
N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1st Dep't 1997); see also Welco Assocs. v. Gordon, 174 A.D.2d 58,

63, 578 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (1st Dep't 1992) (stating that there is no law that
prevents the sponsor from electing a majority of the board as long as the five year
limit has not run). Such issues have come up because sponsors will sell apartments
to "friendly shareholders" in order to sustain voting power that will not be used to
challenge management. See Jacobs, supra note 22. Such an abuse of power should
prevent a cooperative corporation from being deemed viable. Id.

85 Jacobs, supra note 22.
86 See Kane, supra note 8, at 103 (stating wealthy apartment owners welcomed

the ability to pick their neighbors); Riccardi, supra note 18.
87 Jacobs, supra note 22.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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whether a sponsor can file amendments disclosing any
material changes in the status of his financial condition to
satisfy this duty. 9 1 Arguably, however, the sponsor must
do more than merely file these amendments to avoid
abandoning the plan. If a sponsor can fulfill the statutory
requirement by following the black letter of the law while
abandoning the underlying policy behind it, then the
result is essentially the same as if he had abandoned the
plan itself.
Attempting to form a so-called "viable co-op" may mean
sacrifice on the part of the sponsor. In many situations the
sponsor, although allowed to give consideration to his own
financial interests, will be required to sustain a slight loss in
order to fulfill a duty of reasonable efforts. 92 Thus, for example,
where a publisher acts in its own interests and incidentally
lessens the author's royalties, "there may be a point where that
activity is so manifestly harmful to the author, and must have
been seen by the publisher so to be harmful," as to justify a
finding of breach. 93 On the other hand, an exclusive agent is not
required "to spend itself into bankruptcy," even if it is the only
94
way he will be able to fulfill his duty.
Following this analysis, it can be concluded that Jennifer
Realty would be required to sell the unsold shares at less than
their maximum potential market value, but Jennifer Realty
would not be required to sell them at an exceptionally high loss.
As stated above, "'[blest efforts' is a term 'which necessarily
takes its meaning from the circumstances,' "9 which indicates
that market conditions might be taken into account in assessing
the sponsor's responsibility. 96 If the sponsor is so ill-fated as to
90 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2), (5) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2003); N.Y.
COMP.CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, § 18.3(r)(11), (w)(11) (1997).

91 See Jacobs, supranote 22.

92 See Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979)
(analyzing a situation where the exclusive agent pursues its own economic interests

which are contrary to those of the client).
93 Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34,
46, 281 N.E.2d 142, 145, 330 N.Y.2d 329, 334 (1972).
94 Bloor, 601 F.2d at 614.
95 Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd,
601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1972); see supra note 74 and accompanying text.

96 See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Civ. 13-95 (WCC), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2566, at *142 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1993) (allowing consideration of
market conditions in defining an exclusive agent's obligations of best efforts), affd,
32 F.3d 727 (2d Cir. 1994).
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be placed in a position where selling at the current market
conditions would entirely undercut his goals in the transaction,
97
the sponsor should not be required to sell.
It must be acknowledged that it is difficult to draw the line
between a reasonable loss on the part of the sponsor and a loss
that is great enough to qualify as unreasonable. The point at
which the sponsor's fiduciary duty requires the sustainment a
loss and the point at which such a loss is determined to entirely
undercut his goals in the transaction cannot be decided by a
fixed standard or equation. Such a decision is best made on a
case-by-case basis.9 8 Hence, in all instances the answer to such a
question should lay within the court's discretion.
The above analysis undoubtedly applies to vacant units.
Suggesting that it should apply to currently occupied units,
however, would be a very dangerous position. The Martin Act
was explicitly designed to protect tenants who wish to remain
lessees in the case of a cooperative conversion. 99 While it seems
that it would be acceptable for a sponsor to attempt to "buy out"
a current tenant under the Martin Act, it would clearly be out of
line with the express legislative purpose of the statute to
conclude that a sponsor is required to do more than that in order
to sell all unsold units to tenant shareholders. Because the
statute is aimed entirely at protecting tenants' rights, its
purpose would be defeated by any determination that a sponsor
has a duty to actively pursue the buy-out of a currently occupied
unit to the detriment of the occupying tenant. Any other
conclusion might encourage harassing and vexatious methods on
the part of a sponsor to fulfill this duty, and many sponsors may
undertake such means in order to comply with the new
requirement. 10 0
97 Commentators have stated that although most sponsors initiated conversion
with the intent to sell as many units as possible, changing market conditions may
thwart such an intent. Because of poor market conditions, sponsors were unable to
sell at a reasonable market price and found it more advantageous to hold onto units
while continuing to rent them. Such actions are not necessarily fraudulent within
the meaning of the Martin Act, and therefore, sponsors who undertook such actions
should not be penalized. See Mollen, Aug. 28, 2002, supra note 22.
98 It has been suggested that a sponsor should not have to sell if he cannot
obtain the "outsider price," that is "the purchase price that the sponsor establishes
in the offering plan for nonresidents of the building." Romano, June 30, 2002, supra
note 22.
99 See supra note 30.
100 It has also been noted that a sponsor should not be penalized if he was
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III. RISK OF SPONSOR DEFAULT
In response to the Jennifer Realty holding, sponsors have
declared that, "if they are forced to sell unregulated apartments
that generate significant income and retain the low-incomegenerating apartments that remain rent regulated, they may be
compelled to walk away and default on their maintenance
obligations." 101 The problem of sponsor default carries with it
widespread economic and social ramifications for communities
containing co-ops. A defaulted co-op may become run down
leading to poor living conditions for tenants and depressing real
estate prices for the entire neighborhood. It may also cause
further economic hardship to tenant shareholders who would not
be able to sell their shares in the corporation. Beyond that,
sponsor default seriously undermines the Martin Act's goal of
protecting occupying tenants and tenant shareholders. Sponsor
default has been described as "a co-op unit owner's worst
nightmare."10 2 It has always been a serious concern among co-op
corporations and tends to be a sponsor's response to difficulties
in keeping up with maintenance and loan payments. 0 3
Fluctuations in sponsor default rates are often erratic; for
example, in the period of 1989 to 1993, the number of
cooperative sponsors that went into default quadrupled. 10 4
The effects of sponsor default on tenants can be severe and
even devastating. While the remedy for default of a single unit
owner is relatively simple, usually consisting of foreclosure by
the lender and eviction by the co-op board, it is not that simple
when a sponsor retaining ownership of units defaults. 10 5 In this
situation, the tenant shareholders will be forced to take over
payments on the building. They will usually be forced to pay
special assessments in order to keep up payments on the

unable to sell an apartment that has been occupied by a rent-regulated tenant. See
Romano, June 30, 2002, supra note 22.
101 Mollen, Sept. 12, 2001, supra note 20.
102 Lisa S. Lim, An Overview of the Effects of Cooperative Sponsor Defaults, 21
REAL EST. L.J. 349, 350 (1993).
103 See id. (discussing the relationship between co-op sponsors and owners and
the legal and practical effects of sponsor default).
104

See id. at 349.

See Earl W. Jimerson Hous. Co. v. Butler, 102 Misc. 2d 423, 424, 425
N.Y.S.2d 924, 924 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1979) (exemplifying the summary
proceeding that occurs when a single tenant defaults).
105
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building mortgage and to maintain services. 106 Often, they are
financially unprepared to undertake such an obligation. In the
case where these payments are not met, the result will be a
default on the cooperative's underlying mortgage. The risk of
default is even greater in those instances where there is an
extremely high percentage of sponsor owned units, strapping the
tenant shareholders with extraordinarily high assessment fee
payments. 10 7 Here default becomes almost inevitable. 08
Requiring the individual tenant shareholder to engage in
such extreme remedial measures if the sponsor defaults is unfair
to the tenant shareholders. Additionally, putting individual
tenant shareholders at such a risk violates the underlying
principles of the Martin Act. "As early as 1926, the purpose of
the Martin Act was stated as being 'to prevent all kinds of fraud
in connection with the sale of securities ... whereby the public is

fraudulently exploited.' "109 As a result, New York State passed
legislation that is intended to prevent a high incidence of
default. 110 The registration and disclosure requirements found
in the 1960 legislation were meant to promote the same purposes
that are implicit and explicit in the Martin Act."'
The legislation takes a three-pronged approach. 112 The first
prong carries a requirement that sponsors submit a
comprehensive disclosure of their financial status so that
purchasers may make informed decisions about how much risk
Lim, supra note 102, at 355.
See id.
108 See id. at 356 (discussing the cooperative corporation's options where a
sponsor goes into default); see also Peter Grant, Banks Assume Keep Obligations of
Big Sponsor, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Feb. 26, 1990, at 3 (discussing alternative remedies
in sponsor default situations).
109 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting People v. Federated Radio
Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38, 154 N.E. 655, 657 (1926)).
110See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §352-e(1)(b) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2002).
111 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 8, at 46-48 (discussing the legislation, its
history, and its effects on cooperative offerings).
106 See
107

112

The new legislation in effect today is threefold and includes (1) a change in
sponsor disclosure rules, requiring sponsors to more comprehensively
report their financial status to potential purchasers; (2) the creation of a
new mechanism in every new co-op offering plan permitting co-ops to
collect rents directly from non-purchasing tenants in sponsor-owned units;
and (3) the use of the Federal Condominium and Cooperative Conversion
Protection and Abuse Relief Act in the co-op scheme to allow co-ops to
terminate sponsors' self-dealing leases.
Lim, supra note 102, at 371.
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the transaction would involve. 113 Second, the legislation includes
a mechanism in every new co-op offering plan that allows the
cooperative corporation to collect rent directly from nonpurchasing tenants in sponsor-owned units. This is deemed to
be more secure than having the rent money go to the sponsor
first and then to the cooperative corporation. 114 Third, the
Federal Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Protection
and Abuse Relief Act may be used to allow cooperative
corporations to terminate sponsors' self-dealing leases. 115
The risk of sponsor default is real, and the protections
provided in the Martin Act may not be enough to offset this risk.
In future considerations of a sponsor's duties, the courts and the
legislature must be mindful to provide added safeguards against
sponsor default and to avoid inducing such default through their
decisions and legislation.
IV. A MATTER FOR THE LEGISLATURE?
While the Jennifer Realty court made a valiant effort to
resolve the ambiguity inherent in New York's current
cooperative conversion law, its holding was undoubtedly vague,
lacking adequate guidance for application in future cases.
Perhaps the appellate division was merely trying to instigate a
revision of New York General Business Law section 352-eeee.
Such an instance of legislative revision induced by court decision
in New York has occurred in the not too distant past.
Following the 1989 decision of Braschi v. Stahl Associates
Co.,116 the New York State Legislature responded to the court's
decision by making a statutory revision. In Braschi, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the term "family," as contained
in the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, could
reasonably include "those who reside in households having all of
the normal familial characteristics" but are not family in the
traditional sense of being related by blood or marriage. 117 The
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 372-73.
115 Id. at 373-75.
116 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
117 Id. at 211-12, 543 N.E.2d at 54-55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789, 790 (finding same
sex life partner is a "family member" entitled to the non-eviction protections of the
rent control laws based upon a showing of "the exclusivity and longevity of the
relationship [and] the level of emotional and financial commitment"). In formulating
this decision, the court relied heavily on the legislative intent of the regulatory code,
113
114
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legislature subsequently took its cue from the Court of Appeals
and, in 1997, revised the statute, which now includes a definition
of "family member" and extends this definition to include the
interpretation of the Court of Appeals. 118 It is possible that the
appellate division, in deciding Jennifer Realty, was trying to
influence the legislature in the same way that the Court of
Appeals did in Braschi.
But would strict guidelines regarding a sponsor's duty and
the circumstances in which he might be found in breach be the
best solution for this problem? The answer, arguably, is no.
Such a determination needs to be fact sensitive.
If the
legislature were to prescribe strict terms for finding fiduciary
violations, it would be difficult if not impossible to provide the
necessary flexibility in a statute. In making determinations
such as whether or not a sponsor's economic interest would be
undercut by selling at current market conditions, it is imperative
that case specific factors such as market conditions, selling price,
the sponsor's projected loss, and the number of vacant units at
the time of conversion are taken into account. No statute could
adequately cover and provide a remedy for all possible situations
that might arise.
Resolution of this issue might best be achieved through a
comprehensive development of case law. 1 9 Court decisions that
expand on the principles underlying the decision in Jennifer
Realty and set flexible standards for application might be the
most workable way to vindicate the rights of the shareholders in
cooperative conversion situations while allowing for special
circumstances to ease the burden that the sponsor might have to
carry. The counter-argument to this method is that it would
determining that the "measures were designed to regulate and control the housing
market so as to 'prevent... hardship and dislocation.' "Id. at 52 (internal quotation
omitted).
118 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d)(3)(iii) (2001); Rent
Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgins, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 166, 630 N.E.2d 626, 629, 608
N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (1993) (noting that months after the Barachi decision the
meaning of "family member" in the rent control regulations was enlarged to include
"[amny other person.., who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and
interdependence").
119It has been noted that future litigation will be necessary to determine
whether, under the facts of each specific offering, a sponsor has sold enough shares
to create a viable cooperative corporation. See Jacobs, supra note 22. This is because
the offering plan specific to each cooperative corporation will need to be analyzed.
See Mollen, Aug. 28, 2002, supra note 22.
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increase litigation flowing through the courts and subsequently
place such a heavy burden on the judges and the system that it
would undermine judicial efficiency. 120 Yet, such undesirable
consequences may also result from legislation that is too vague
or too stringent to allow reasonable application and just results.
The optimal resolution might be a general legislative
mandate that would specifically require sponsors to market
unsold shares within a reasonable amount of time. Such a
general mandate could either be silent on the precise details of
the duty, leaving them to the courts to work out, or the
legislature could spell out guidelines in the mandate that would
provide useful guidance to the court in determining whether the
sponsor has fulfilled his fiduciary duty to sell the unsold shares.
These guidelines should be considerations that the legislature
deems to be important in formulating the decision. For example,
controlling guidelines might include what percentage of shares a
sponsor may own during each year subsequent to conversion and
the maximum percentage of loss a sponsor may be forced to
endure in selling shares before the loss would be considered

unreasonable. 121
CONCLUSION

While the Jennifer Realty court had many means available
to find an implied duty on the part of a sponsor to sell unsold
shares, finding such a duty in the offering plan was the least
controversial method. Whatever method the court employed to
120 Litigation inspired by the appellate division's holding has already begun. At
the end of August 2002, Justice LaCava for the supreme court tried Michelangelo
Apartment Inc. v. 687 Associates, a case in which a cooperative corporation
instituted an action as a third party beneficiary of an offering plan. In that case, the
plaintiff relied on Jennifer Realty for standing. The cause of action was dismissed
without prejudice on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute such
an action. For the opinion, see Decision of Interest, N.Y. L.J., August 28, 2002, at 24.
121 Those who advocate the imposition of a strict duty to sell shares should be
aware of the possible implications. If a sponsor who is holding large blocks of unsold
shares is suddenly forced to sell, it will place a glut of apartments on the market.
Furthermore, because in a cooperative corporation a sponsor does not need to obtain
board approval in order to sell units, prospective buyers will be more likely to buy
from the sponsor rather than from a tenant shareholder, making it more difficult for
such a tenant shareholder to sell his own unit. Another equally important
consideration on the part of shareholders should be that the high rents that
sponsors are able to charge for deregulated units offset the low rents they receive
from rent regulated units. Being able to offset the cost of rent regulation is likely to
reduce the incident of sponsor default. See Romano, June 30, 2002, supra note 22.
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find this duty ultimately has no effect on how the duty plays out.
Traditional principles of contract interpretation apply, although
the issue does fall largely under real estate law. Under these
principles, the sponsor has both a duty of "good faith" and "best
efforts" in acting in his capacity as an exclusive agent toward the
other shareholders. This duty requires the sponsor make efforts
to sell unsold shares, even if it means sustaining a pecuniary
loss. The sponsor would only be allowed to refrain from
marketing unsold shares when selling the shares would result in
substantial monetary loss. Furthermore, to keep the sponsor's
duty in line with the legislative purpose of New York's General
Business Law section 352-eeee, this duty only applies to vacant
units. In formulating and enforcing this duty, courts must be
cautious to avoid instigating sponsor default, which would
violate the principles underlying the Martin Act. Because
determinations of whether or not the sponsor has fulfilled this
duty is highly fact sensitive, it is best to develop standards
through case law rather than attempt to encompass all possible
situations in one statute.
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